Constraining non-computational functionalist theories of consciousness via the simulation hypothesis

We present a novel philosophical argument drawing on the connection between computational functionalism and the simulation hypothesis. In this context, the simulation hypothesis holds that our entire universe, which includes human consciousness, is being simulated at the fundamental physics level on a generic Turing-equivalent architecture with no special consciousness-relevant properties. The computational functionalism in scope specifies that if the right algorithm is implemented on any Turing-equivalent architecture then the system will be conscious (and that such an algorithm exists for any possible conscious experience). We leverage the connection between these positions to constrain alternatives to computational functionalist. Given a series of assumptions, we conclude that (1) it is not possible to rule out computational functionalism without also ruling out the simulation hypothesis, and (2) a major class of non-computational functionalist theories of consciousness must either derive from theories of physics which somehow rule out the simulation hypothesis or appeal to something outside of physics to explain consciousness. We argue therefore that the non-computational functionalist cannot explain consciousness 'on the cheap' within conventional physics, but must instead adopt a more radical position. Objections and responses are discussed as part of the paper.